Another decision of the Constitutional Court in the conflict between the "limitation period" and the "limitation period"

By its decision of February 15, 2023, the Constitutional Court came to the conclusion that the terms specified in Article 551 of the Civil Code o should be considered the period of action. In short, these periods do not void obligations.

For an introduction, I would like to point out that while the statute of limitations nullifies the right, the statute of limitations does not nullify the right, but limits the possibility of enforcement of the claim. If the right becomes invalid, then any result associated with it is impossible. For comparison, you can see my analysis of the CC's invalidation decision in my post here.

The crux of the applicant's question to the CC is as follows:

• According to article 385 of the Civil Code, the concept of an obligation includes the creditor's right to demand performance simultaneously with the debtor's obligation;
• After the expiration of the time limits provided for in Article 551, the right to claim for the listed obligations becomes invalid;
• Since the right to claim has disappeared, the obligations have also disappeared, therefore these terms are similar to the limitation periods;
• But in Article 551 “the legal consequences of the flow of time limits and the provisions of subsequent articles on stopping and interrupting the flow of these time limits give reason to say that these time limits are not a limitation period, but a limitation period. "
• How, then, should the terms of Article 551 be applied?

Interestingly, both the German Civil Code and the Russian Civil Code (including the text from the late 1990s) that govern the termination of obligations, although most of the grounds for termination are similar, do not contain provisions for termination due to expiration. It may have been considered that the general provisions on the limitation period were sufficient.

According to the petition, the specific contradiction is that “whereas Article 551.2.1 of the Civil Code provides for a 5-year period for claiming rent, rent, interest on capital and other periodic payments [duration] from obligations to be made from time to time Claims the deadlines for incoming claims are defined in Article 373.3 of the Civil Code as 3 years.

Also, my attention was drawn to the contradictions between the headings and the text of paragraph 5 of article 551. The headings of the articles use phrases like "termination of obligation", and the text of the articles uses phrases like "termination of the student" and "requirements become invalid". This is where the real confusion comes in. By ignoring the titles of the articles and using the simple meaning of the rules in the articles, perhaps the problem can be solved directly. But it seems appropriate to seek clarification from the Constitutional Court.

I do not think that it is right for the applicant to consider the requirement in this context as an integral element of the obligation, referring to Article 385 of the Civil Code . Under the same approach, the rule that "the time limit applies to the right of claim" in relation to the limitation period should have invalidated the corresponding obligation. So, in the simplest sense of the word, "expiration of a claim" should not mean the termination of the obligation associated with it, but again, consider the analysis of CC below.

According to the conclusion of the Constitutional Court, the time limits provided for in Article 551 should be considered as the time limits for claims. The rationale is as follows:

• The phrase "the right to claim may be terminated due to the expiration of the term" in Article 550 is not the same as "terminated", i.e. is not a peremptory norm, so it is assumed that the right to claim may remain in force even after these periods have passed.
• For example, the right of the debtor to refuse to perform the obligation after the expiration of the period is mentioned in article 554.1. If there is a right to refuse to perform the obligation after the expiration of the period, then the obligation has not expired.
• Another example is Article 554.2. This article states that "it is impossible to claim back what was executed in payment for a claim that has become invalid due to the expiration of the period." In other words, the obligation is in force and the law recognizes the fulfillment of this obligation. If the expiration of the term, according to the requirement, would extinguish the obligation, then the law would recognize the right of the debtor to restitution.
• If such a legal regime is provided, then the obligation continues to exist after the expiration of this period. That is, the purpose of these rules is not to terminate the obligation, but to limit the possibility of realizing the claim, as in the case of limitation of actions.
• It is also noted that the rules for the flow, interruption, suspension of terms in Article 551 are similar to the corresponding regime for the flow of claims. I want to note that such a regime of time flow is not typical for cut-off periods.

In its decision, the CC additionally states that in the event of termination on the basis of another termination of the obligation (for example, on the basis of debt forgiveness) provided for in Chapter 27 (Termination of Obligations), the performed performance may be reclaimed. That is, from the rules on other grounds for termination than expiration, it follows that the obligation associated with this no longer exists, and there can be no question of enforcement of a non-existent obligation. The conclusion also notes that “until the legislature improves paragraph 5 of Chapter 27 of the Civil Code, in respect of claims arising from obligations, including periodic ones, the time limits for claims provided for in Chapter 18 of this Code shall apply. payments."

But how can the legislature improve paragraph 5 of Article 27? Perhaps by amending Chapter 18 of the statute of limitations.